Equity Trading Systems in Europe - A survey of recent changes by FOUCAULT, Thierry & DEMARCHI, Marianne
1
Equity Trading Systems in Europe






This draft: February 1998
We are grateful to Jim Angel, Ian Domowitz, Bertrand Jacquillat, Richard Lyons and Bernard
Marois for their comments on the initial draft and to the representatives of the exchanges
surveyed in this paper, who kindly answered questions about the new features of their trading
systems. We also thank the participants of the SBF, NYSE joint conference on Global Equity
Markets in Paris and Ludovic Goebbels for excellent research assistance. The comments and
opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the SBF-
Bourse de Paris. All errors that may remain are ours.
Correspondence:
M. Demarchi, SBF-Bourse de Paris, Dpt of Research and Development, 39 rue Cambon, 75001 Paris,
Tel: (33) 1 49 27 14 19, Fax: (33) 1 49 27 12 55, E.mail:marianne.demarchi@bourseparis.com
T. Foucault, HEC, Dpt of Finance, 1 rue de la Libération, 78351, Jouy en Josas, France. Tel: 33 1 39 67
94 11. Fax: 33 1 39 67 70 85. E.mail: foucaultErreur! Signet non défini.2
Abstract
This paper provides a survey of recent changes in the market microstructure of the 5 largest
European Stock Exchanges. We first provide a brief statistical overview of European equity
markets. Then we discuss how the introduction of the Investment Services Directive and the
development of institutional trading have prompted European Stock Exchanges to modify their
trading systems since 1994. We show that these exchanges have converged to a similar market
organization. In this organization, trading takes place in an order-driven market but trading rules
can vary according to the type of securities. We also describe the remaining differences between
the trading systems, in particular with respect to the consolidation of the order flow and
transparency.3
1. Introduction
Since 1994, four new equity trading systems have been introduced by major European
exchanges: TSA by the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1994, SWX by the Swiss Exchange in
1995, SETS by the London Stock Exchange and XETRA by Deutsche Börse AG, both in 1997.
Furthermore, the Paris Bourse upgraded its trading system and reviewed its trading rules in 1994,
introducing NSC, a new release of its former trading system CAC. Table 1 in the Appendix
provides an overview of these new trading systems. The purpose of this article is to describe their
main features and to survey these recent changes in the market microstructure of European Stock
Exchanges.
We show that these trading systems share two common features. First they are all electronic
order matching systems, which essentially operate as order-driven markets. Second the trading
rules in these systems can vary according to the type of security (namely its capitalization and/or
its liquidity) or the type of orders (namely large, medium or small orders). This segmentation of
the market by securities’ types or by orders’ types allows exchanges to respond better to the
variety of needs of both investors and firms.
We also stress that important differences remain among the trading systems surveyed in this
paper. In particular, they significantly differ with respect to the degree of consolidation of the
order flow. In the Paris Bourse and the Swiss Exchange, a very large proportion of all trades
takes place within the trading system (NSC or SWX). On the contrary, the order flow remains
fragmented in the London Stock Exchange and in Germany for stocks that trade in SETS and
XETRA, respectively. Actually, in these two cases, the trading systems operate in tandem with
other trading venues (a telephone market in London and floor trading in Germany). Furthermore
the level of transparency is not the same in all the trading systems. First they do not provide the
same level of pre-trade transparency. For instance, public investors can observe all the orders
placed in the limit order book in SETS, the five best bids and offers in NSC and TSA and only
the best bid and offer in SWX and XETRA. Second the level of post trade transparency also
differs for large trades. Finally we point out differences in the obligations and privileges of the
dealers operating in these trading systems and the clearing and settlement procedures of the
exchanges.
It is worth stressing that we do not provide a detailed account of the evolution of European4
trading systems since the London "Big Bang" of 1986. This account and the causes of the
evolution of European trading systems at the end of the 80s' and at the beginning of the 90s' are
already well-known (see Pagano and Röell (1990) or Pagano and Steil (1996)). Rather we focus
on the main causes of the creation of the new trading systems that are surveyed in this paper. We
identify two main causes: (i) the Investment Services Directive that creates a more competitive
environment for European Stock Exchanges and (ii) the concomitant growth of institutional
investors’ trading and cross-border trading (for diversification purpose) by these investors.
Our analysis is limited to equity markets. It is important to note, however that the trading
systems used for derivatives have also evolved in the recent years (see Benos and Crouhy
(1996)). Several articles (e.g. Pagano and Röell (1990), Röell (1992), Huang and Stoll (1990),
Pagano and Steil (1996), Benos  and Crouhy (1996), Benos (1998)) have provided descriptions
of European equity trading systems until 1995 or have focused on a single Stock Exchange (e.g.
Hamon (1995), Le Fol (1998). Our paper complements these articles since it describes features
of trading systems that were not in place when these studies were written.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a statistical overview of the
different exchanges. In Section 3, we present the new environment in which European Stock
Exchanges operate. Section 4 reviews the recent changes that occurred in the five Stock
Exchanges that are the focus of the present article. Section 5 describes the main features of the
new trading systems introduced in these exchanges. Section 6 concludes.
2. European Equity Markets: A statistical Overview.
In this section, we provide several measures (namely market capitalization, number of listings and
market turnover) of the relative sizes of the exchanges whose trading systems are described in
this paper. The figures for 1998 are given as of September 1998.
Figure 1 in the Appendix compares, in 1990 and 1998, the market capitalization of domestic
companies of countries in the European Union (without Ireland
1) and Switzerland.
Here Insert Figure 1
                                                       
1 Before December 1995, figures for the Irish Stock Exchange were aggregated with those of the London Stock
Exchange.5
The five largest exchanges with regard to market capitalization are located in the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands. It is worth noting that the
Netherlands and Switzerland experienced the two largest increases in the value of their shares
(respectively 336% and 261%) in the 90s’. The ranking of the exchanges in term of number of
listings (Figure 2) closely reflects the ranking in term of market capitalization. Spain appears to
have a relatively large number of listings, due to cross-listings of Spanish firms on the three
regional exchanges (Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid).
Here Insert Figure 2
Another way to judge of the size of the different equity markets is to compare the market
capitalization with a measure of the economic activity, e.g. the Gross Domestic Product (Figure
3). Market capitalization is relatively large in the U.K, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The
importance of equity markets traditionally has been smaller in France and Germany. But, in these
two countries, the ratio of market capitalization to GDP has significantly increased in 1998, up to
59% in France and to 46% in Germany. Indeed, in all European countries, equity markets play a
more and more important part in the economy. In particular, Switzerland, Spain, Finland and the
Netherlands have all experienced a dramatic increase in market capitalization relative to the size
of their economy.
Here Insert Figure 3
This growing place of stock markets in continental Europe has been accompanied by an increase
in turnover (See Figure 4)
2. This increase has certainly been a spur for changes in equity trading
systems at the end of the 80s’ and during the 90s’. The Netherlands and Switzerland have
experienced the largest increases in market turnover, followed by the U.K. and France. The
increase in Germany has been relatively more modest.
Here Insert Figure 4
Figure 5 provides the market turnover of these exchanges in 1997. As usual comparisons based
                                                       
2 Market turnover, in a given year, is the total value of share trading in that year.6
on market turnover must be treated with caution. Actually European exchanges do not measure
and report trading volumes in the same way (See Pagano and Steil (1996), Gresse and Jacquillat
(1998) and FIBV). We have decided to report market turnover figures using the REV approach
3.
Market turnover is obviously related to market capitalization. For this reason, the ranking of the
major European exchanges in term of turnover closely follows the ranking in term of market
capitalization.
The following picture emerges at the end of this brief review. In Europe, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K dominate in term of trading volume, market capitalization
and number of listings. This is one of the reasons of our interest in the trading systems that have
been implemented in these countries. The other reason is that these trading systems have all
experienced major changes recently.
3. Equity Trading Systems in Europe: A New Environment.
In this section, we describe the main recent changes in the environment in which financial markets
operate in Europe, namely:
(a) A change in the regulatory environment for financial markets in the European Union, with the
introduction of the Investment Services Directive (ISD).
(b) The development of institutional trading in Europe.
These changes have provided the stimulus to the recent wave of innovations in trading systems,
that we describe in the next sections.
3.1 The Investment Services Directive.
The ISD was adopted by the European Union in 1993 and defines a unified regulatory framework
for the securities industry in the European Union. There are 3 main aspects of the ISD that
impact Stock Exchanges:
                                                       
3 There are two approaches to collecting turnover statistics: Trading System View (TSV) and Regulated
Environment View (REV). In the first approach, only the transactions taking place on the exchange are
considered as part of this exchange turnover. In the second approach, all the transactions that are subject to the
exchange supervision are taken into account.7
- First, the ISD allow financial intermediaries of the European Union to operate in all the
countries of the Union. As a result these intermediaries can trade directly on other European
Union’s exchanges and can by-pass the member firms of these exchanges.
 
- Second the ISD gives Stock Exchanges the possibility of establishing remote members
without obtaining first the approval of the remote member’s State (so called «single
passport» provision). Under the ISD, it is sufficient for an exchange to be designated as a
regulated market
4 in its home country, to be able to operate in all the other Member States. It
follows that an exchange can offer foreign financial intermediaries the possibility of trading on
its system, using screens that are based in the home country of the intermediary. Such a
strategy of remote membership has already been implemented by some Stock Exchanges in
Europe. For instance, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange provides trading screens to 58 remote
members.
 
- Third, the ISD authorizes the creation of new exchanges
5 and OTC trading. In this way, 3
new European Stock Exchanges have been created since 1995: Tradepoint, an electronic
order-driven market based in London, Easdaq and EuroNM
6, which are markets for small
capitalization firms with high growth potential. By allowing OTC trading, the ISD enables
trading between members either directly or through proprietary electronic trading systems
(so-called PTS) for stocks listed on European exchanges. Thus investors could by-pass
traditional exchanges by operating through these systems. This is already the case in the
United States, where PTS such as Instinet or Posit capture 20% of trading volume in US
shares.
The ISD prompted exchanges to review their trading systems, for 2 reasons. First the ISD
removes some barriers to entry that were protecting the Stock Exchange of each Member State.
In this way it has opened the road to new competitors (e.g. Tradepoint). It also eases trading by
financial intermediaries outside their home market, which also reinforces competition. This
prospect of an accrued competition has accelerated the overhaul of their trading systems by
                                                       
 
4 A regulated market must comply with a minimum set of rules regarding market access, listing requirements,
trading and transparency. These requirements are defined by the ISD. See Steil (1996).
5 Under the ISD, a trading venue can be considered as an exchange if it satisfies the requirements to be considered
as a regulated market.
6 The years of creation of these exchanges are respectively 1995, 1996 and 1997. EuroNM links the segments for
small capitalization stocks of the Brussels Stock Exchange, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the Paris Bourse and
Deutsche Börse. These segments are respectively: EuroNM Belgium, NMAX, Nouveau Marché, and Neuer Markt.8
European Stock Exchanges. In particular, the automation of the trading process has been a way
for exchanges to reduce both development and operating costs (Domowitz and Steil (1998))
7 and
thus to reduce their fees. Electronic trading also facilitates entry in markets dominated by
competing exchanges. Stock Exchanges are also merging equity and derivatives markets in order
to create new synergies (as, for instance, in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland)
and they are building alliances and cooperation schemes with other exchanges. Second,
exchanges have altered their trading rules to make sure that they are eligible as regulated
markets. For instance, the London Stock Exchange increased the level of post trade
transparency, which was lower in SEAQ than in continental exchanges (see Section 5.2.3).
3.2. The development of institutional trading.
The importance of domestic and foreign institutional investors (banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, mutual funds) keeps growing in Europe. For instance, institutional investors today
hold 60% of French market capitalization, (of which 35% is held by foreign investors), 50% of
German market capitalization (of which 12% is held by foreign investors) and 74% of British
market capitalization (of which 16% is held by foreign investors)
8. American investors are
increasingly diversifying their portfolios by investing in foreign securities, especially in Europe.
Between 1980 and 1995, the total investment of US investors in foreign securities grew from
USD 53 billion to USD 2600 billion
9.
The introduction of a single currency (the Euro) in the European Union will accelerate this trend.
Furthermore some institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds, are still
restricted in their foreign investments. These restrictions will disappear with the single currency.
For these reasons, cross-border trading by European institutional investors can be expected to
grow. As a result institutional investors will increasingly be in search of a single trading system
that would allow them to trade in all European securities, including derivatives.
In face of this growing importance of institutional trading, the trading systems used by Stock
Exchanges have partly been devised in order to respond to the needs of institutional investors.
Recent surveys in the United States (Economides and Schwartz (1995)), in Europe (Schwartz
                                                       
7 Domowitz and Steil (1998) estimate that development costs are at least 3 to 4 times higher for floor trading
based systems than for electronic order matching systems.
8 Source: Stock Exchanges.
9 Source: Securities Industry Association, 1996 Securities Industry Fact Book.9
and Steil (1996)) and in France (Demarchi and Thomas (1996)) have shown that institutional
investors are concerned by execution costs. Ultimately these costs impair their portfolios’
performance. In particular, these surveys show that institutional investors are willing to sacrifice
immediate execution if this sacrifice results in lower trading costs. For this reason, exchanges are
designing their trading mechanisms with a view at offering a choice between immediate execution
or delayed execution. The London Stock Exchange, for instance, has emphasized that one
purpose of SETS (a new order-driven market, see below) is to reduce trading costs by offering
the opportunity of trading patiently, with limit orders, to investors. Institutional investors also
often trade in large sizes. For this reason, exchanges have designed special trading procedures for
large trades (see Section 5.1.2).  Finally exchanges have merged equity and derivative markets
and they have started developing similar trading systems for the securities traded in these markets
(e.g. in France and in Switzerland).
4. Equity Trading Systems in Europe: The Recent Changes.
In this section, we outline the main changes that occurred in the recent years in the Stock
Exchanges that we survey. The features of the new trading systems offered by these exchanges
will be presented with much more details in the next section. In the rest of the paper, we often
categorize the trading systems as continuous order-driven markets, call auctions or quote-driven
markets. The basic features of these trading mechanisms are defined in Appendix A.
4.1 The Amsterdam Stock Exchange.
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange introduced major changes in the organization of its trading
procedures in 1994. Following these changes, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange reviewed the
organization of its electronic trading system TSA in 1997 and took new measures implemented in
1998.
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange distinguishes two different segments: the retail segment and the
wholesale segment. Orders for a size below a threshold chosen by the exchange for each stock
belong to the retail segment and must be placed in a central limit order book (or traded between
members at the best bid and offer). Orders above the threshold can trade outside the central limit10
order book by members acting as principal
10.
The retail segment is organized as an electronic order-driven market (TSA).  The limit order
book of each stock is managed by a single broker-dealer
11, the «Hoekman», whose role is similar
to that of the «specialist» in the NYSE. The «Hoekman» has the obligation to post quotes for a
minimum number of shares that varies according to the type of stock. He is required to
participate in trading only where necessary as a result of inadequate order flow and he can only
trade with members (restricted capacity). In 1997, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange altered the
Hoekman’s privileges for the most liquid stocks (those that are included in AEX and AMX
indexes). For instance the following privileges were suppressed: (i) exclusive knowledge of
traders’ identities (ii) possibility of price improvement of an incoming order within 15 sec and (iii)
possibility of freezing the limit order book in other cases than when his quote has been lifted.
Measures of Hoekman’s performance have been devised as well and, in the future, stocks will be
allocated on the basis of a periodic review of this performance.
Until 1997, the wholesale segment was organized around two electronic trading systems: AIDA
and ASSET
12. ASSET was an electronic quotation and advertisement system in which brokers
could post indicative quotes for large orders. It was abolished in 1997. AIDA was an inter-
member trading system, organized as an electronic order-driven market. AIDA was particularly
attractive because trading was completely anonymous and fees were lower than in the retail
segment. But for this reason, part of the order flow was diverted from the central limit order
book. In order to consolidate the order flow, the exchange decided to suppress AIDA as well.
Orders above the wholesale limit can now be executed either directly with a counterparty, outside
the central limit order book or against the limit order book. For the time being, no price links are
enforced between the prices in the wholesale segment and the retail segment.
4.2 Deutsche Börse AG
13.
                                                       
10 The wholesale thresholds are currently under review. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange considers the possibility
of a distinction based on the type of investor (retail/institutional) rather than on the order size.
11 As of 1996 there were 7 Hoeklleden on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange against 50 in 1983 (Source: Anslow
(1996)).
12 ASSET stands for Amsterdam Stock Exchange System. AIDA means Automatic/Interprofessional Dealing
System Amsterdam.
13 Deutsche Börse AG is the holding company for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Terminbörse
(DTB) derivatives exchange.11
A main feature of Germany is that trading still takes place in eight different Stock Exchanges:
Berlin, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, Munich and Stuttgart. Companies
can be listed on one or several of these exchanges, which in case of cross-listings result in order
flow fragmentation
14. For each exchange, trades take place on a floor. Each stock features a limit
order book that is managed by one broker-dealer: the «Kursmakler». Orders are routed to the
«Kursmakler» either directly by brokers on the floors or through an electronic order routing
system (BOSS). Frankfurt is the major German exchange, with 520 domestic listed companies
and accounts for 90% of turnover in value for DAX securities and 83% for MDAX stocks
15.
In April 1996, the Exchange Council of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange decided to introduce an
electronic order matching system, XETRA in replacement of IBIS, an electronic trading system
introduced in 1991 to trade the most liquid stocks. IBIS was an inter-dealer-broker system,
which operated in tandem with the floors of the German exchanges. It was designed for
wholesale trading since only orders above 100 or 500 shares (depending on stock price) could be
placed (versus a minimum of 50 shares on the floor). IBIS had features of both an order-driven
and a quote-driven system. In contrast XETRA is a pure electronic order-driven market. Specific
members (the «Betreuers») can provide additional liquidity for medium and less liquid stocks.
The main features of XETRA are described in more details in the next section.
The implementation of XETRA aimed at reducing market fragmentation, improving market
quality by concentrating liquidity in one central order book, and strengthening the Deutsche
Börse’s position in German equity trading. However, XETRA still operates in parallel with floor
trading on the eight German Stock Exchanges.
XETRA was developed and implemented on a step-by-step basis, in several releases. In June
1997, Release 1 provided XETRA Front End. On November 1997, XETRA Back End was
introduced with Release 2. On this occasion, XETRA replaced IBIS for wholesale trading in
approximately 100 stocks (including the DAX component stocks). On October 1998, it was
supplemented by retail trading for all stocks, bonds and exchange traded warrants. Release 4 will
be introduced in 1999 and will include a block trading facility.
                                                       
14 A market is fragmented if orders for a given stock can be routed to different trading venues. Differences in
order handling procedures are one source of fragmentation. Cross-listings or in-house trading are other sources of
fragmentation.
15 The DAX index includes the 30 largest German stocks by capitalization and MDAX include 70 mid-size
German stocks.12
4.3 The London Stock Exchange.
The London Stock Exchange has traditionally been organized as a dealer market. In 1986, it
introduced a screen-based system, SEAQ, on which dealers can post two-sided quotes for a
minimum order size, mandated by the exchange
16. But this innovation did not modify the quote-
driven structure of the London Stock Exchange. In these conditions, the introduction by the LSE
of an electronic order-matching system, SETS, in October 1997 appears as a major change.
This new order-driven market replaces SEAQ for all the FTSE 100 stocks (plus approximately
30 other stocks). It will gradually be implemented for FTSE 250 stocks that are still traded on
SEAQ. Until June 1998, only medium-sized orders were executed through SETS, retail orders
being executed by member firms or Retail Service Providers (RSPs’) at SETS best bid and ask
prices and orders larger than 10 NMS (Normal Market Size)
17 could not be executed in the limit
order book. For now, there is no minimum order size so that small orders can be executed either
directly against the limit order book or through RSPs’ at best market prices. Furthermore the
maximum order size allowed in SETS has been increased from 10 to 20 NMS and a new closing
price calculation has been introduced (a weighted average of transaction prices in the last 10
minutes of the trading day). Finally the LSE has recently modified the organization of the call
auction that opens the trading day. The duration of the pre-trading phase is shorter and trading
starts later in the day. It is worth stressing that, for all stocks of the FTSE 100 index, members
can still act as counterparty for all order sizes and conduct trades by phone, outside the central
limit order book.
4.4 The Paris Bourse.
The Paris Bourse is the first European exchange to have introduced a fully computerized order-
driven market in 1986, the CAC system. Furthermore, order routing, data dissemination, clearing
and settlement have been fully automated and integrated with the CAC system. In the recent
years, the trading system of the Paris Bourse has been modified along two dimensions.
                                                       
16 A similar system, SEAQ-I, exists for foreign stocks.
17 The Normal Market Size varies according to the liquidity of a stock and represents at least 2% of its average
trading volume.13
First, the CAC system has been technologically improved. For instance, investors can now
directly route their orders to the central computer. This means that their orders are placed
automatically on the order book without any reentry by brokers (so-called open-architecture).
Moreover the capacity of order flow treatment has been increased from 30 orders to 60 orders
per second. Finally, it offers now a greater flexibility for trading. For instance, the system gives
the possibility to place new types of orders (At Any Price, Stop Orders, All or None) and trading
lots have been suppressed in September 1995. Following these technological improvements, the
name of the system changed and became NSC (Nouveau Système de Cotation). All stocks listed
on the Paris Bourse trade on NSC. Furthermore NSC is also used to trade derivatives (NSC-VF
and NSC-VO are the NSC versions developed for futures and options trading
18).
Second, some trading rules have been significantly altered. Thus dealership services were
gradually introduced to provide additional liquidity to the limit order book. Member firms can act
as market makers for medium liquidity stocks through Registered Dealers Agreements introduced
in 1992. They can also act as market-makers for small capitalization stocks listed on the Nouveau
Marché. Since 1994 and only for the most liquid stocks, member firms acting as principal can
execute trades that are larger than a given threshold (the Normal Block Size)
19, at a price outside
the best bid and ask prices. Until 1994, the member firm acting as principal had the obligation to
execute all the limit orders placed at better prices (in the limit order book) than the block price.
This obligation has been suppressed in September 1994.  Now the Paris Bourse requires block
prices to be inside the Weighted Average Spread (WAS), which is the difference between a
weighted average of the best ask prices and a weighted average of the best bid prices
20, 
21.
4.5 SWX Swiss Exchanges.
As in Germany, trading in Switzerland was taking place on three different Stock Exchanges:
Basel, Geneva and Zurich. These 3 exchanges merged into SWX Swiss Exchange in 1995 and
                                                       
18 MONEP and MATIF which manage the French options and derivatives markets moved exclusively to electronic
trading in 1998.
19 The NBS is the minimum order size for an order to be eligible as a block trade. For each stock, it is roughly at
least equal to 2.5% of the average daily trading volume in the last quarter and equal to 7.5 times the average depth
at the best bid and ask prices in the last quarter.
20 The computation of the WAS is based on all displayed orders in the book up to the Normal Block Size (NBS).
For very large trades (>5NBS), the weighted average spread can be enlarged (computation of SuperWAS on
request by the Paris Bourse).
21 Other changes in trading rules for the Paris Bourse include the enforcement of time priority in the opening call
auction and the implementation of a closing call auction in June 1998.14
their floors were replaced by an electronic order matching system, under the name of SWX
(previously EBS). SWX is an electronic order-driven market which matches all orders in one
limit order book (a special procedure exists for odd lots). More information is provided below on
the main features of this trading system. Two other major changes took place in 1995. First,
SWX Swiss Exchange developed a fully computerized settlement system, operated by SEGA.
The specificity of this settlement system is to link in real time trading and settlement in stocks,
bonds, funds and warrants. Second a new federal exchange regulation came into force, in
replacement of the various regional laws covering the listing and trading of securities.
5. Main Features of European Trading Systems.
In this section, we describe the basic design features of the trading systems used by the European
Stock Exchanges that are the focus of this paper. In Section 5.1, we first focus on their common
features. Then, in Section 5.2, we review some of the differences that still remain between these
trading systems. For each subsection, the discussion is supplemented by tables that are provided
in the Appendix.
5.1. A common feature: Market Segmentation.
The architectures of the exchanges considered in this paper share a common feature. Instead of
using a unique trading mechanism for all the stocks and for all the orders, exchanges use a variety
of trading mechanisms. In fact exchanges have defined different trading segments according to
various criteria. A specific trading mechanism is associated to each segment. We describe below
the criteria that are used by exchanges in order to segment their stock market.
5.1.1 Trading mechanisms by type of stocks
Stocks are classified by exchanges according to their liquidity and/or their capitalization. Thus
different groups of stocks are defined and different trading mechanisms are used for each group.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the trading mechanisms that are used in each segment.
As an illustration, we consider in detail the case of the Paris Bourse. In the Paris Bourse, stocks
can be traded, on NSC, in 3 different markets: (i) «Le Premier Marché», (ii) «Le Second15
Marché» and (iii) «Le Nouveau Marché»
22. Stocks are allocated to these different market
segments according to their capitalization. «Le Premier Marché» includes large French and
foreign companies, «Le Second Marché» caters to medium-sized companies whereas «Le
Nouveau Marché» is designed for high-growth companies. Roughly, these markets are organized
as order-driven markets. However, they are significant differences in the trading mechanisms
used in each market. In particular, market-makers, can operate in «Le Second Marché» and «Le
Nouveau Marché»
23.  Stocks listed on  «Le Nouveau Marché» are traded using a dual trading
mechanism: they are called twice a day (at the open and at the close) and are continuously traded
by market makers posting bid and ask quotes between these two calls. The obligations and the
privileges of the market makers in these 2 markets are described in Section 5.2.2.
The Paris Bourse also classifies stocks according to their liquidity
24. Thus stocks can belong to
three different groups: «Continu A», «Continu B», «Fixing A «. Stocks with high or medium
liquidity belong respectively to the first two groups. The last group includes stocks with low
liquidity. Each trading group has its own trading mechanisms. Stocks in the first two groups are
traded in a continuous order-driven market. Less liquid stocks are traded through call auctions,
twice a day. Furthermore, for each group, different maximum authorized daily price variations
are applied (see Section 5.3).
As it can be seen in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the same type of segmentation is used in the other trading
systems. In XETRA, stocks with high or medium liquidity are traded in a continuous order-
driven market. Less liquid stocks, those with a monthly turnover lower than DM 20 million, are
traded in one or several call auctions per day. Dealers (Designated Sponsors called «Betreuers»)
can intervene for medium and less liquid stocks. In the London Stock Exchange, trading for the
stocks of the FTSE 100 index (most liquid stocks) takes place in an order-driven market (SETS)
whereas other stocks are still traded in a dealership market (SEAQ). In the Amsterdam Stock
exchange, the most liquid stocks, those belonging to the AEX and AMX indexes, are traded in a
continuous order driven market with automatic matching. For medium and less liquid stocks,
execution is not automatic but controlled by the Hoekman who enters quotes manually.
                                                       
22 There is another market segment on the Paris Bourse: OTC-free market which is an unregulated market with no
listing requirement. Stocks in this segment trade in a call market, once a day.
23 Market-makers are respectively called «Animateurs» (in Second Marché) and «Introducteurs Teneur de
Marché» (ITM) in the Nouveau Marché.
24 The Paris Bourse measures liquidity by the trading volume (number of shares and amounts traded) and by the
number of orders entered into the system.16
SWX is the only exchange that does not provide specific trading mechanisms by type of stock.
All stocks are traded in a continuous order driven market. The stocks included into SMI index
have a smaller authorized maximum price fluctuation (0,75% from last traded price versus 2%
for all other stocks), however.
5.1.2 Trading mechanisms by order size
In this case, the trading mechanism varies with the size of the order. This size can be defined  in
term of number of shares or in term of monetary value. Three different types of orders are
defined, small orders, medium-sized orders and large orders, to which specific trading procedures
may be applied by exchanges. These procedures are described in the third column of Table 3, for
each trading system.
Small Orders.
All the exchanges but the Paris Bourse use distinct procedures to handle orders below a minimum
order size (odd lots). In the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, small orders are executed against  the
«Hoekman» inventory at best bid and ask prices
25. In SETS, brokers can direct small trades to
the central limit order book or to Retail Services Providers (5 or 6 largest brokers). In the latter
case, execution prices offered by RSPs’ must be as good as the best bid and offer standing in the
book. In XETRA, odd lots are aggregated and executed in the next call auction. In SWX, odd
lots can be placed only as market orders. They can be executed against each other at the last
transaction price or they  accumulate and they are executed in round lots against the orders
standing in the book.
In the Paris Bourse, odd lots were suppressed in September 1995. The purpose of the Bourse
was to increase individual investors’ access to the market and to consolidate liquidity in one
central order book
26. For now, all orders can be placed and executed on NSC.
                                                       
25 The Amsterdam stock exchange is considering a new rule for small orders under which they would be executed
against the Hoekman’s inventory at the mid-quote (and not at the best bid and ask prices).
26 Interestingly, the elimination of odd lots has indeed improved market liquidity, especially for medium size
stocks and for high-price stocks.  A study from the Paris Bourse, « From Round Lot Trading to Units Trading: An
Empirical Investigation of the Paris Bourse », Department of Research and Development, SBF-Paris Bourse, May
1998, reveals that, following the elimination of odd lots, spreads declined significantly, with no decrease in
market depth. Furthermore for these stocks, the suppression of odd lots was accompanied by a sharp increase in
the number of buy and sell orders.17
Medium-Sized Orders
In all the trading systems considered in this paper, medium-sized orders are traded in continuous
order-driven markets or in call auctions. For these orders, member firms (other than designated
sponsors such as for example «Betreuers») can also act as principal. In the Paris Bourse or in
TSA, member firms acting as principal must trade within the framework of the order book, at
best bid and ask prices. On the contrary, in SETS and XETRA, principal trading for medium-
sized orders can be conducted outside the central limit order book.
Large Orders (Block Trades)
A block trade is defined with respect to a threshold, which can be specified in term of number of
shares or effective value. In all exchanges, orders above this threshold can be traded away from
the central order book by members acting as principal (or as brokers crossing clients’ orders).
The thresholds for each of the trading systems considered in this paper are described in the
second column of Table 3,
For orders that are eligible as block trades, the trading mechanism can switch from an order-
driven mode to a quote-driven mode. The organization of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange based
on the distinction between the wholesale segment and the retail segment (see Section 4.1)
provides a good illustration. The prices of block trades must comply with specific rules that aim
at linking the central limit order market and the block market. Specific rules also apply to the
delay for the publication of block trades. These rules are described in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3,
respectively. For the time being, there are no defined rules for block trading in Germany. A block
trading facility
27 will be introduced in XETRA with the introduction of Release 4 in 1999. For the
time being, block trades can be conducted off-XETRA as OTC trading.
In SWX, large trades (larger than CHF 200,000 for individual orders) may be executed off-
system. For  these trades, SWX offers a trading facility that provides for a form of electronic
negotiation. Using this facility, a member can make Statement of Interests that indicate to the
other members, in a non-binding manner, that he or she would like to trade in a certain stock.
Members can also direct an Addressed Offer to a specific member (or to several specific
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members), which can then be accepted, ignored or rejected. The situation for SETS is special
since member firms can act as principal for all order sizes. However, the London Stock Exchange
has introduced a special procedure (Worked Principal Agreement (WPA)) for large trades (> 8
NMS) in SETS. Under a WPA, a member firm acting as principal and its client agree to execute,
at some point in time in the future, a large trade. The price and size of the trade are determined at
the time of the agreement but the member must offer price and/or size improvement.
5.1.3 Trading Mechanism and Time of the day
In most of the exchanges considered in this article, a call market is used to open the trading day
for the stocks traded in continuous time (see Table 4). In the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the
opening price is determined by the Hoekman. A call auction is also used to close the trading day
in NSC, SWX and XETRA.
XETRA has a unique feature: the use of intra-day call auctions integrated with a continuous
order-driven market. The call auctions
28 take place at pre-specified points in time. At the time of
the call auction, the continuous trading process stops. During a pre-trading phase, traders can
submit limit and market orders, which are added to the orders initially standing in the book. The
time at which the pre-trading phase stops is determined randomly. At this point in time, a clearing
price is determined. The orders that could be executed at this price but are not, form the surplus.
Just after the call, an order book balancing phase (that lasts 30 seconds) takes place. During this
phase, the Betreuers first and then all market participants can execute the surplus at the clearing
price. Then trading restarts in the continuous order-driven mode.
5.1.4 Summary
The previous overview shows that European exchanges converge toward a similar organization
of trading. The main features of this organization are as follows:
(i) Continuous order-driven markets are used for large capitalization stocks and for liquid
stocks.
(ii) Dealers can provide liquidity in small capitalization stocks, illiquid stocks and immediacy
to very large orders.
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(iii) Call markets are used to open and to close the trading day. They can also be used to trade
less liquid stocks.
Important differences remain between exchanges, however. They will be described in the next
section. We close this subsection by providing some possible explanations for the emergence of
common features in European trading systems.
Trading Costs
There is substantial empirical evidence that trading costs are smaller in order-driven markets than
in quote-driven markets, at least for small and medium-sized orders. Many of the empirical
findings have been obtained by comparing the trading costs in Nasdaq (a quote-driven market)
and the NYSE (an order-driven market)
29.
Similar findings have been obtained in Europe by comparing trading costs for stocks that trade
both in continental exchanges and in SEAQ-I. For instance, DeJong, Nijman and Röell (1995)
perform such a comparison for French stocks
30. First they compare the quoted spreads
31 (at the
time of a transaction) in the Paris Bourse and SEAQ-I for different order sizes. They find that for
all order sizes, the quoted spreads in Paris are lower than in SEAQ-I. Many transactions take
place inside
32 the quoted spreads («the market touch») in SEAQ-I. For this reason, quoted
spreads tend to overestimate effective trading costs in SEAQ-I. In order to avoid this bias,
DeJong et al. (1995) compare also effective spreads
33 for different order sizes. They also find
that effective spreads are lower in Paris, for all order sizes in their sample. However, these results
must be interpreted with caution. First (at the time of this empirical study) the distribution of
order sizes is markedly different between the Paris Bourse and SEAQ-I. The orders in the Paris
Bourse are of smaller sizes than the orders in SEAQ-I. The low frequency of transactions in large
sizes in the Paris Bourse makes trading costs comparisons more difficult for large sizes. Second,
spreads in London are posted including commissions and taxes, which is not the case in Paris.
The recent creation of SETS also offers the opportunity to compare the impact of an order-
                                                       
29 See, for instance, Huang and Stoll (1996a), (1996b).
30 Other empirical studies include Schmidt and Iversen (1992) and Davis (1993) for German stocks and DeGryse
(1997) for Belgian stocks.
31 The quoted spread is the difference between the best ask and bid price.
32 See Reiss and Werner (1995).
33 For a given transaction, the effective spread is the difference, (in absolute value) between the transaction price
and the mid-price.20
driven market on trading costs. Empirical studies on SETS are still scarce but the existing studies
suggest that trading costs have been reduced for stocks that trade on SETS. For instance,
Gemmill (1998) finds that the average market touch
34 have been reduced after the introduction of
SETS and the modal (most frequently posted) touch at the close has fallen significantly.  A study
of the Plexus Group (1998) compares execution costs for a sample of U.K and US institutional
investors. The study finds that for these institutional investors, execution costs have significantly
decreased after the introduction of SETS.
The advantage of continuous order-driven markets with respect to trading costs for orders of
small or medium sizes can explain why they are now predominant in Europe for these order sizes.
In fact, as shown by Pagano and Steil (1996), the order flow on SEAQ-I started declining after
the introduction of electronic order-driven markets on continental exchanges. Large trading costs
on medium size orders, in SEAQ, also attracted competition from Tradepoint, an electronic
order-driven market based in the U.K. In this context, the creation of SETS can be seen as an
attempt by the LSE to restore its competitiveness on the segment of small and medium-size
orders.
Immediacy
It is well-known (see Pagano and Steil (1996) and Pagano and Röell (1990)) that this is under the
competitive pressure of SEAQ-I that continental exchanges introduced specific trading
mechanisms for block trading, at the end of the 80s’. Actually SEAQ-I was diverting the order
flow from traders seeking to execute large trades. In order-driven markets, these trades take time
to execute. Actually, the depth of the limit order book can be insufficient to accommodate,
quickly, very large orders without a substantial price impact. In order to minimize this price
impact, the block trade must be split into smaller pieces, which are executed over time against the
prices in the limit order book. Consequently traders in search of a quick execution can find more
attractive to trade with a dealer, who is willing to provide immediacy. The competitive response
of continental exchanges was to design their trading systems in such a way that they allow dealers
to step in for very large trades, as discussed in Section 5.1.2.
Note that the coexistence of a limit order book and market making mechanisms for large trades
gives investors the possibility of choosing between trading patiently by working an order in the
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limit order book or trading immediately off the limit order book, at principals’ prices. As
investors pay more and more attention to execution costs, they are likely to base their choice on
the relative costs of the two trading procedures.
Liquidity
The use of electronic call markets and/or dealers in small-capitalization stocks can be seen as a
way to enhance the liquidity of these securities.
Electronic call markets have several advantages. First their operating costs are low. Second, in
thin markets, by aggregating a large number of orders, a sequence of call auctions results in
lower price variability than in a continuous auction (see Garbade and Silber (1979), Pagano and
Röell (1990)). This reduces the deviations between the fundamental value of the asset and
transaction prices. In this way, call auctions result in lower execution costs.
There are at least three benefits to the presence of dealers in small-capitalization stock markets.
First, they can provide immediacy in between call auctions and additional liquidity in continuous
market. Second, they can, and are indeed often required to, complement the supply of liquidity at
the time of the call auctions. Finally, they also play a role as sponsors of small stocks, either
because they have an obligation or incentives
35 to produce information on the stocks in which
they make the market.
Price Discovery
Call markets are frequently used to open the market. One possible reason is that they better
aggregate information and thus facilitate price discovery in subsequent continuous trading. Price
discovery is particularly important and difficult when the market opens because of uncertainty
concerning the asset valuation following the overnight trading interruption. Biais, Hillion and
Spatt (1995) provide an empirical analysis of the pre-trading phase before the market opening in
the Paris Bourse. They find empirical evidence that price discovery occurs during the pre-trading
phase, especially toward the end of this phase. This result supports the view that a pre-trading
phase and the call auction contribute to informational efficiency
36.
                                                       
35 In the «Nouveau Marché», the dealers («Introducteurs Teneur de Marché) must provide information on stocks
in which they make the market. Angel (1997) argues that large spreads on Nasdaq provide dealers with incentives
to promote stocks in which they make the market.
36 Madhavan and Penchapagesan (1998) also study theoretically and empirically price discovery at the opening of
the NYSE. They show that the specialist in the NYSE contributes to price discovery at the opening.22
5.2. Remaining differences between European exchanges.
There are four main important differences that remain between European exchanges:
(i) Trading systems do not reach the same level of consolidation of the order flow.
(ii) The obligations and the privileges of dealers differ in each system.
(iii) Pre-trade transparency and Post-trade transparency differ between exchanges.
(iv) Clearing and settlement procedures are not standardized.
5.2.1 Consolidation of the order flow
Exchanges have not reached the same degree of consolidation of the order flow (see Table 5) yet.
With this respect, we can distinguish three groups of exchanges. In the first group, which
includes the Paris Bourse and the Swiss exchange, the order flow is highly centralized and price
links between on and off-system trades are enforced. In the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the
order flow is centralized but there are no formal price links between on and off-system trades.
Finally the third group, which includes the London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse, is
characterized by a fragmentation of the order flow.
NSC concentrates more than 90% of the turnover value (source: Paris Bourse). The order flow is
also highly centralized in Switzerland since SWX concentrates 80% of the turnover value
37.
Moreover, in these exchanges, links between transaction prices and order book prices are
enforced. In NSC, block trades for the most liquid stocks (approximately 90 stocks) can be
conducted away from NSC. However, block trade prices must be at or within the Weighted
Average Spread
38 computed for each stock. The Swiss Exchange enforces the Best Execution
Principle, under which off-system trades have to be executed at prices at least as favorable as
SWX prices.
                                                       
37 Source: Presentation of Antoinette Hunziker-Ebneter, CEO of SWX Swiss Exchanges at a conference organized
in Frankfurt, October 22 and 23, 1998, « The Stock exchange of the Future ». In addition, we calculated the
turnover in value captured by SWX for SMI stocks based on real time data from October 19 to November 13,
1998. We found that on average 86% of all transactions in value were taking place in SWX.
38 The Weighted Average Spread has been defined in Section 4.4. For very large trades (so called  "structural"
blocks)  prices must be at or within +/-10% of the best bid and ask prices. The definition of a structural block is
given in Table 9.23
To some extent, concentration of the order flow is even greater in NSC than in SWX. Actually,
there are no odd lots in NSC. Thus, even very small orders are executed within the limit order
book and participate to price formation. In contrast, the Swiss exchange imposes a minimum size
for orders that are placed in the central limit order book. This minimum order size varies from 5
to 100 shares depending on stock prices and can be placed only as market orders (See Section
5.1.2).
The Amsterdam exchange is also characterized by a relatively high centralization of the order
flow. Actually, TSA concentrates approximately 70% to 80% of turnover in value
39. However,
there is no formal price link between on and off-TSA trades, leading to partial fragmentation. It
follows that trades can be conducted at quite different prices in the wholesale and the retail
segments. The Amsterdam stock exchange is considering imposing a new rule that would
reinforce centralization of the order flow. Under this new rule, wholesale prices for trades
between members would have to be at best bid and ask prices. However, such a requirement
would not be enforced for trades between a member and an institution.
For FTSE 100 stocks, orders can be executed either on SETS or through members dealing
outside of SETS, as principal or as broker. This coexistence of two trading venues leads to
market fragmentation and in fact SETS captures only 30% to 35% of the total trading volume in
eligible shares (60% of all eligible trades)
40. This figure goes up to 50% if one adjusts for double-
counting. There are at least two reasons for this diversion of order flow from SETS. First, it
takes time to change trading practices in a market place, which traditionally was operating as a
quote-driven market. It follows that institutional traders keep trading with market-makers for
large size orders
41. Second, by design, a large part of the order flow used to be excluded from
SETS. Orders greater than ten times Normal Market Size (NMS) were not accepted into the
order book. Furthermore retail orders were exclusively executed by member firms (Retail Service
Providers). These trading rules were undermining the liquidity of SETS by reinforcing the
                                                       
39 Source: Exchange officials. In addition, we calculated the turnover in value captured by TSA for AEX stocks
based on real time data from October 19 to November 13, 1998. We found that on average 85% of all transactions
in value was taking place in TSA.
40 Source: London Stock Exchange. In addition, we calculated the turnover in value captured by SETS for
FTSE100 stocks based on real time data from October 10 to November 10, 1998. We found that on average 33%
of all transactions in value was taking place in SETS.
41 See «Market Square up to Change», Financial News, October 5
th, 1998. According to a study by Board and
Wells (1998), SETS account for a very large proportion (67.6% in value) of trades below 0.5NMS (trades for 2000
to 25,000 shares) and a relatively large proportion (46.5% in value) of trades between 0.5NMS and 1NMS (25,000
to 75,000 shares). But more than 97% by value of trades larger than 2NMS are conducted away from SETS.24
tendency to fragmentation. As an attempt to solve this problem, the minimum order size has been
suppressed in June 1998 and the maximum order size is now equal to twenty NMS (see also
Section 4.3).
In addition, the London Stock Exchange does not enforce any rules regarding the prices at which
trades conducted outside SETS can take place. Those trades can be executed at any price,
though, in practice, price formation is mainly established through the order book, with 75% of all
business being conducted at order book prices
42.
In Germany, fragmentation of the order flow arises from the possibility for orders to be directed
either to XETRA or to the floor of one of the eight Stock Exchanges. Furthermore, member
firms can trade OTC without any restrictions on trading prices. According to recent estimates,
25% of the trading volume for stocks in DAX and 74% of the trading volume for stocks in
MDAX are realized through floor trading
43. As in London or Amsterdam, no price link is
enforced between XETRA and the floors, which may lead to discrepancies in the prices posted in
these two trading venues
44. As for OTC trading, no figures (prices or volumes) are available.
OTC trading is reported at the end of the trading day, as part of the total trading volume.
According to our estimations for October 1998
45, OTC trading represents 70% of total trading
volume for the biggest stocks.
5.2.2 The role of dealers
As previously mentioned, some of the trading systems (namely NSC, XETRA, and TSA) allow
dealers (so-called Animateurs in NSC, Betreuers in XETRA and Hoekleden in TSA) to provide
additional liquidity for small capitalization or less liquid stocks. These dealers are compensated
for the services they provide by receiving privileges. These privileges and the corresponding
obligations significantly differ among exchanges. Table 6 provides a summary of these obligations
and privileges.
                                                       
42 Review & consultation, Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service, London Stock Exchange. See also Board
and Wells (1998).
43 Source: DBAG. In addition, we calculated the turnover in value captured by XETRA for DAX stocks based on
real time data from October 15 to November 12, 1998. We found that on average 76% of all transactions in value
for these stocks was taking place in XETRA.
44 For instance the newspaper Welt Am Sonntag of Saturday, November, 7, 1998 reports price discrepancies larger
than 1%.
45 We calculated OTC turnover for the nine largest market capitalizations using real time data  for October, 1998.25
The Paris Bourse introduced Registered Dealers Agreements (RDAs’) in 1992 in order to
improve liquidity of medium and less liquid stocks
46. Under RDAs’, Animateurs (one or more per
stock) continuously have to post bid and ask quotes for a minimum amount which varies
according to stock liquidity
47 with a maximum spread of 5% (2% for more liquid stocks). They
have similar obligations in the pre-trading phase before call auctions. It is important to note that
these offers are made within the limit order book of each stock. Thus Animateurs directly
compete with other limit order traders. Market surveillance checks in continuous time that they
comply with these obligations. As a compensation, Animateurs do not pay trading fees.
Furthermore the Animateur of a stock has the possibility of signing a liquidity agreement with the
major shareholders of the company and other financial intermediaries. Under this agreement, the
Animateur and the other participants in the agreement commit capital in order to sustain the
liquidity of the stock in which the Animateur makes the market. They do not have other
privileges over market participants
48.
In contrast with NSC’s Animateurs, Betreuers (one or more per stock) in XETRA are not
obliged to continuously post bid and ask quotes for a minimum quantity. They are only required
to respond to members’ requests (indication of buy or sell interest) by entering a two-side quote
(with a maximum spread of 2.5% to 5% depending on stocks) within a fixed period of time and
for a minimum amount
49. They must also place orders during the pre-trading phase in call
auctions. Their performance is checked on a monthly basis. As a compensation, Betreuers do not
pay trading fees. They also have knowledge of the identity of the member making a request.
Finally, in call auctions, they have priority of execution for the surplus remaining at the end of the
call auction (during the Order Book Balancing Phase) with a maximum possible trade size per
Betreuer (20 times the minimum quote size).
5.2.3 Transparency
                                                       
46 In 1998, 225 stocks are traded with RDAs’.
47 These amounts are respectively FF50,000 for stocks that trade continuously (liquid stocks) and FF20,000 for
stocks that only trade in call auctions (less liquid stocks).
48 For stocks that trade on the Nouveau Marché, market makers have similar obligations. They are required to post
bid and ask quotes for a minimum quantity that varies from 100 to 1000 shares depending on the stock price with
a maximum spread of no more than 10%. They also make similar offers 15 minutes prior to each call auction. As
a compensation, market makers do not pay trading fees and can be the counterparty of all trades (even for
principal trades conducted by other members if they wish so).
49 These amounts vary from DM 20,000 to DM 60,000 depending on stocks26
The transparency of a market is the amount of information regarding the trading process,
available to participants. Transparency is a fundamental issue in the design of markets and plays a
critical role in the price discovery process. It is useful to distinguish between pre-trade and post-
trade information. Pre-trade information is the information available to traders (members and
public investors) concerning the orders which are currently standing in the market and the prices
at which incoming orders are likely to be executed. Post-trade information is the information
available to traders about the details of past transactions (prices, volumes). The exchanges that
are reviewed in this paper do not offer the same level of pre-trade and post-trade information to
all market participants.
Pre-Trade Information
Table 7 in the Appendix provides an overview of the rules pertaining to pre-trade transparency in
the continuous trading periods of NSC, SETS, SWX, TSA and XETRA.
The information provided by market organizers can vary according to the type of  participant. As
a general rule, member firms have access to more information than public investors. They can
observe the entire limit order book. Furthermore in NSC they have access to brokers-ID. In the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the Hoekman knows the identities of the traders placing orders but
this information is not (automatically) available to other traders. In XETRA, Betreuers know the
identity of the members placing a request.
The information made available to public investors significantly differs across markets. With this
respect, pre-trade transparency  in SWX and XETRA is low, since public investors only have
access to the best bid and ask prices and the quantities offered at these prices
50. In contrast, pre-
trade transparency is high on SETS since all limit orders are displayed. NSC and TSA are in an
intermediate situation since public investors observe a subset of all limit orders posted in the
market, namely the five best ask and bid prices on each side of the market.
Some trading systems offer the possibility of partially controlling the information available to
other traders. In particular, traders can submit hidden limit orders. A hidden limit order is
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composed of two parts: (i) one part, which is publicly displayed and (ii) another part that is not
displayed
51. The hidden part is displayed only after the first part executes. Harris (1996) argues
that hidden orders are used as defensive strategies against the free option problem faced by limit
order traders. As the value of the free option increases with asset volatility, he predicts that
hidden orders must be used more frequently in a high volatility market. In line with this
prediction, Harris (1996) finds empirically, using Paris Bourse data, that both the fraction of
hidden orders and the size of the hidden part increase with volatility. Using Paris Bourse data,
Duteil and Vacheron (1996) show that hidden orders can also reduce price impacts.
Call markets starts with a pre-trading phase during which traders can submit, modify or cancel
orders. Market organizers can provide two types of information during this phase (See Table 8):
(a) information on the orders submitted to the market and (b) information on the Indicative
Equilibrium Price. The Indicative Equilibrium Price is the price at which trades would be
conducted if the opening occurred at that precise instant. In SETS, the book is opened (all orders
are disclosed). On the contrary the book is closed (no order disclosed) in SWX and XETRA. In
TSA, the book is opened to members, 5 minutes before the opening. In NSC, the system
broadcasts all updates in the order book and all the orders which would not be executed at the
Indicative Equilibrium Price. NSC and SWX publish an Indicative Equilibrium Price during the
entire pre-opening period. On the contrary, the Indicative Equilibrium Price in XETRA is
published a few minutes before market clearing.
Post-Trade Information
Market organizers must choose the speed with which (i) the price of a transaction, (ii) the size of
the transaction and (iii) (maybe) the identities of the parties involved in the transaction will be
published.
In all the markets, publication of trades of small and medium sizes is immediate. On the contrary,
publication of large trades can be delayed. Publication of large trades is problematic. Actually it
jeopardizes the ability of a market maker involved in the block trade to unwind his position in
good conditions. Thus quick publication can ultimately result in bad prices for block trades.
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However, large trades are informative. For prices in the central limit order market to reflect the
information contained in these trades, a quick publication of the price and the size of the block
trade is necessary. Timely publication is also necessary in order to prevent counterparties in a
block trade from trading on their superior information. This can ultimately impair the liquidity of
the central limit order book, by increasing the adverse selection risk faced by limit order traders.
Given these costs and benefits of quick publication of large trades, exchanges allow traders to
delay publication of the large trades in which they are involved. The conditions under which this
delay can occur and its duration vary across exchanges, however (See Table 9).
5.2.4 Clearing and settlement
Clearing and settlement procedures are important features of a trading system because the cost of
clearing and settlement is part of the total trading cost. The Central Securities Depositories
(CSDs’) are the firms in charge of the clearing and settlement functions. They often offer
additional services such as custody, corporate dividends processing or coupons payments
etc…These firms are in general distinct from the Stock Exchanges although the latter can own a
stake in their domestic CSD.
In all the trading systems considered in this paper, clearing and settlement is fully computerized
(see Table 12). But these systems feature 2 important differences with respect to clearing and
settlement. First the settlement cycles differ between the trading systems. The Swiss exchange
has a unique feature: a simultaneous, final, irrevocable delivery versus payment which allows
traders to trade, pay, deliver and receive confirmation of the transaction in less than 10 minutes.
For the other exchanges, it takes between 2 to 5 days in order to clear and settle a transaction.
Second, in some CSDs’ (namely SICOVAM and NEGICEF), only net trades are settled whereas
the other CSDs’ (e.g. CREST) practice trade by trade gross settlement. Netting reduces trading
costs since fees are only charged on net trade and not trade by trade.
These differences in settlement and clearing rules across countries are a major obstacle to the
emergence of a single European CSD. However a single CSD might be a more efficient way to
clear and settle trades in Europe, especially with the development of cross-border trading (see
Giddy, Saunders and Walter (1996)).29
Finally it is worth stressing that only the Paris Bourse and the Amsterdam Exchanges have a
Central Clearing House that guarantees the final settlement of trades between members. Since
traders do not deal with one another but with the clearing house, there is no risk of payment or
delivery failure. Such a guarantee limits the credit risk, which naturally arises in an order driven
market since traders cannot choose their counterparty.
5.3 Other features of European equity trading systems.
The previous section has described the main features of the new equity trading systems in Europe
and how they differ across exchanges. These systems are characterized by many other trading
rules, which also influence the price formation process. We now describe these rules.
5.3.1 Price determination in Call markets
In all the trading systems that we have reviewed, the clearing price in call auctions is chosen in
such a way that it maximizes trading volume. There might be several prices that satisfy this
requirement, however. In such a case, additional criteria must be used to set the clearing price.
As shown (in a simpler environment) by the theory of double-auctions
52, these secondary criteria
can potentially influence traders’ bidding behaviors and thus are important for price formation.
In the Paris Bourse and XETRA, the second criterion is to minimize surplus, i.e. the number of
shares that could trade at the clearing price but cannot find sufficient quantity on the opposite
side of the market. If there is more than one price that satisfies this second criterion, the system
selects the price which is the closest to the last traded price (previous closing price in general). In
SETS, the auction price is the average of all eligible prices (i.e. all the prices that maximize
trading volume) rounded up to the nearest tick. In SWX, only the principle of volume
maximization is used. Finally, in TSA, the choice of the clearing price, in the set of eligible prices,
is at the Hoekman’s discretion.
5.3.2 Order Types
The traders have access to a large variety of orders to carry out their trade. The different possible
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types of orders are described in Tables 10.1 and Tables 10.2 in the Appendix. Limit orders and
market orders are two main types of orders. A limit order specifies a price and the maximum
quantity a trader is willing to buy or to sell at this price. A market order is an order to buy or to
sell a given quantity at any price. As a consequence, a market order can trigger the execution of
several limit orders as it walks up or down the book. The Paris Bourse offers the possibility of
submitting «At market orders». These market orders only execute against the best quotes. The
unfilled part of the order is automatically transformed into a limit order. Some trading systems
(NSC, XETRA) allow traders to use orders that must be executed entirely or not at all («Fill or
Kill Orders»). Furthermore NSC, XETRA and SWX offer the possibility of submitting stop
orders. A stop order is an order that becomes activated when  the price of the stop order is
reached. A buy (sell) stop market order is transformed into a buy (sell) market order when it is
activated. A buy (sell) stop limit order is transformed into a limit price (at the stop price) when it
is activated.
Note that the set of eligible orders that can be different in continuous auctions and in call
auctions. For instance, in SETS, traders can only use limit orders in the opening call auction.
5.3.3 Priority Rules
Priority rules specify the sequence in which limit orders are executed. In all trading systems, price
priority is enforced. According to this rule, buy orders with higher prices take precedence over
buy orders with lower prices and vice versa for sell orders. When several orders are placed at the
same price, secondary priority rules are used. Time priority is the secondary priority rule that is
used in all the systems considered in the paper. According to this rule, orders, at a given price,
are executed in sequence according to their arrival time
53.
The choice of secondary priority rules is important because it influences the traders’ incentives to
provide liquidity (Harris (1990), Angel (1997)). A strong argument in favor of time priority is
that it encourages price competition among traders. Actually late limit order traders must
improve upon existing quotes in order to increase their execution probability. Accordingly, using
data from the Toronto Stock Exchange, Penchapagesan (1997) finds that quote improvements
are indeed more frequent when time priority is enforced than when it is not.
                                                       
53 Execution priority can be contingent on the nature of the order, however. For instance, in NSC, SWX and TSA,
displayed orders have priority over hidden orders at a given price.31
5.3.4 Tick Size
In securities markets, traders must post their offers on a pre-specified price grid. The tick size is
the increment between two successive prices on this grid. The tick size is in general a step
function of the stock price and is chosen by the exchange. For instance in XETRA, the tick size is
equal to 0.01 DM for stocks with prices lower than 100 DM and is equal to 0.05 DM for stocks
with larger prices and on the Paris Bourse, the tick size varies from 0,001 euro to 0,50 euro
depending on stock price (See Table 11).
The tick size is an important variable of choice for market designers. Actually it puts a floor on
the minimum size for the bid-ask spread. As such it influences the size of the trading costs.
Several Stock Exchanges have reduced their tick sizes recently
54. For the Toronto Stock
Exchange, empirical studies
55 find a decrease in the quoted and effective spreads following the
decrease in the tick size in April 1996. They also find a decrease in quotation size, however. In
fact a too small tick size can impair market quality. Harris (1996) argues that a sufficiently large
tick size is necessary for time priority to be meaningful. Furthermore a large tick size protects
limit order traders against the free option problem. Harris (1996) finds that limit order traders
display their orders more and post orders for larger sizes when the relative tick size is large.
Cordella and Foucault (1997) show analytically that a large tick size induces traders to post more
rapidly competitive offers. For this reason, they find that the tick size that minimizes trading costs
is always strictly positive.
5.3.5. Trading Halts and Circuit-breakers
All the trading systems resort to trading halts. Trading halts are triggered when the deviation of
the last transaction price from a reference price exceeds a threshold chosen by the exchange. For
instance, in NSC, the trading halt occurs for liquid stocks («Continu A») when the price deviates
by more than 10% from the closing price of the previous trading day. Trading restarts after 15
minutes and the two subsequent deviations cannot be larger than 5%. For medium liquidity
stocks («Continu B»), the initial authorized maximum deviation from the closing price is 5%,
trading restarts after 30 minutes and the subsequent two deviations are limited to 2.5%.
                                                       
54 For instance, the AMEX in 1992, the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1995 and the NYSE in 1997.
55 See Bacidore (1997) and Ahn, Cao and Choe (1996), for instance. Harris (1997) provides a survey.32
The reference price, the duration of the halt and the authorized deviation vary across exchanges.
For instance in SETS, the reference price is the first trading price of the day and the maximum
authorized deviation is 20%. The duration of the halt is 10 minutes. XETRA is unique in that, for
this trading system, the maximum authorized deviations for each stock are not publicly known.
TSA bans program trading if AEX index rises or falls by 2%, or more, within 15 minutes. A
trading halt for all stocks is then implemented and lasts 15 minutes. All trading activity is stopped
if the index rises or falls by more than 5%.
6. Conclusion.
In this paper, we have described the organization of trading in the major European Stock
Exchanges (in term of market capitalization, number of listings and market turnover). Each of
these Stock Exchanges has introduced a new trading system in recent years, for all or part of the
listed stocks. These new trading systems are essentially electronic order-driven markets, but
allow the intervention of dealers. Although the organization of trading in the European exchanges
is becoming increasingly similar, we have emphasized that major differences  remain between the
trading rules. In particular, the level of order flow consolidation and the level of transparency still
vary across European exchanges.
7. Bibliography.
Angel, J. (1997), «How best to supply liquidity to a small-capitalization securities market»,
mimeo, Georgetown University.
Ahn H.J., Cao, C. and H. Choe, (1996), «Tick Size, Spread and Volume», Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 5, 2-22.33
Anslow, M, (1996), «Hybrid System Recovers Market Share for Amsterdam Exchange»,
European Securities Trading.
Bacidore J., (1997), «The Impact of Decimalization on Market Quality: An Empirical
Investigation of the Toronto Stock Exchange», Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6, 92-120.
Benos, A., (1998), «European Capital Markets and the EMU», Hitotsubashi Journal of
Commerce and Management, 33, 43-63.
Benos, A. and Crouhy, M. (1996), «Changes in the Structure and Dynamics of European
Securities Markets», Financial Analysts Journal, May/June.
Biais, B., Hillion, P. and Spatt, C., (1995), »Price discovery and learning during the pre-opening
period in the Paris Bourse», mimeo, Toulouse University.
Board J., and Wells, S., (1998), «The Evolution of Order Book Trading and Analysis of
Transaction Costs», Financial News, October 5.
Cordella, T. and Foucault, T. (1997), «Minimum Price Variations, Time Priority and Quote
Dynamics», Discussion Paper, HEC.
Davis, R., (1993), «London Trading in German Equities», Stock Exchange Quarterly with
Quality of Market Review, Winter.
DeGryse H., (1997), «The Total Cost of Trading Belgian Shares: Brussels versus London»,
Discussion Paper Series, n° 1581, CEPR.
DeJong, F., Nijman, T. and A. Röell, (1995), «A Comparison of the Cost of Trading French
Shares on the Paris Bourse and on SEAQ International», European Economic Review, 39,
1277—1301.
Demarchi, M. and Thomas, S. (1996), «French Institutional Investors: Investment Process,
Trading Practices, and Expectations», Working Paper, SBF-Paris Bourse.
Domowitz, I. (1990), «The mechanisms of Automated trade Execution Systems», Journal of
Financial Intermediaries, 1, 167-194
Domowitz, I. and Steil, B. (1998), «Automation, Trading Costs and the Structure of the
Securities Trading Industry», mimeo.
Duteil G. and Vacheron, D. (1996), «Pre-Trade Transparency in the Paris Bourse: The Impact of
the Hidden-Order Procedure», Working Paper, CETFI-University of Aix-MarseilleIII.
Economides, N. and Schwartz, R. (1995), «Electronic Call Market Trading», Journal of
Portfolio Management, Winter.
Economides, N. and Schwartz, R. (1995), «Equity Trading Practice and Market Structure:
Assessing Asset Managers’ Demand for Immediacy», Financial Markets, Institutions, and
Instruments, 4.34
Garbade, K.D. and Silber, W.L., (1979), «Structural Organization of Secondary Markets:
Clearing Frequency, Dealer activity and Liquidity Risk», Journal of Finance, 34,577-593.
Gemmill, G., (1998), «The Evolution of Order Book Trading and Analysis of Transaction
Costs», Financial News, October 5.
Giddy, I, Saunders, A. and Walter, I., (1996), «Clearance and Settlement», in Steil (Ed.), «The
European Equity Markets», Chapter IX, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
Gresse, C. and Jacquillat, J. (1998), «The Diversion of Order Flow on French Stocks from CAC
to SEAQ International: a Field Study», European Financial Management, 2.
Hamon, J., (1995), «Marchés d’Actions», Economica.
Harris, L., (1990), "Liquidity, Trading Rules and Electronic Trading Systems", New York
University Salomon Center Monograph Series in Finance, Monograph 1990-4.
Harris, L., (1996), «Does a large minimum price variation encourage order exposure», mimeo,
University of Southern Califiornia.
Harris, L., (1997), «Decimalization: a review of the arguments and evidence», mimeo, University
of Southern California.
Harris (1990), «Liquidity, Trading Rules and Electronic Trading Systems», New-York University
Salomon Center Monograph Series in Finance, Monograph n
0. 1990.4.
Huang, R. and Stoll, H., (1990), «Major World Equity Markets: Current Structure and Prospects
for Change: London, Paris and Toronto », Working Paper, Vanderbilt University.
Huang, R. and Stoll, H., (1996a), «Competitive trading of NYSE listed stocks: measurement and
interpretation of trading costs», Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 5, 1-53.
Huang, R. and Stoll, H., (1996b), «Dealer versus Auction Markets: a Paired Comparisons of
Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE», Journal of Financial economics, 41, 313-357.
Le Fol, G., (1998), «Le Marché Francais des Actions», Thèse de Doctorat, Université Paris I.
Madhavan, A. (1992), «Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets», Journal of Finance, 47,
607-640.
Madhavan, A. and Penchapagesan, V. (1998), «Price Discovery in Auction Markets: a Look
Inside the Black Box», mimeo, University of Southern California.
Pagano, M. and A. Röell, (1990), «Trading Systems in European Stock Exchanges: Current
Performance and Policy Options», Economic Policy, 10, April.
Pagano, M. and A. Röell, (1992), «Auction and Dealership Markets», European Economic
Review, 36, 613-623.
Pagano, M. and B. Steil, (1996), «Equity trading I: The evolution of European trading systems»
in Steil (Ed.), «The European Equity Markets», Chapter I, Royal Institute of International35
Affairs, London.
Panchapagesan, V. (1997), «What if time priority is not enforced among traders», mimeo,
University of Southern California.
Plexux Group, (1998), «The Evolution of Order Book Trading and Analysis of Transaction
Costs», Financial News, October 5.
Röell, A. (1992), «Comparing the Performance of Stock Exchange Trading Systems», in
Singleton J. and D. Schoenmaker (Eds.), «The Internationalization of Capital Markets and the
Regulatory Response», Graham and Trotman, London.
Reiss, P. and Werner, I., (1995), «Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets: Evidence from the
London Stock Exchange» in Lo, A. (Ed), The Industrial Organization and Regulation of the
Securities Industry, University of Chicago Press, 125-176
Satterthwaite, M. and S. Williams (1991), «The double auction market: Institutions, Theories and
Experimental Evaluations», working paper, Northwestern University.
Schmidt, H. and P. Iversen (1992), «Automating German Equity Trading: Bid-As Spreads on
Competing Systems», Journal of Financial Services Research, 373-397.
Schwartz, R.A. and B. Steil (1996), "Equity Trading: Institutional Investors' Trading Practices
and Preferences", in Steil (ed.) «The European Equity Markets», Chapter III, Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London.
Tagaki, S. (1996), «Ripples from the Big Bang: Developments in the Secondary Stock Markets





In order-driven markets, all potential buyers and sellers can directly trade together. To this end,
public investors (or their brokers) post offers to buy or to sell, for given quantities («limit
orders »). The set of all buy and sell offers, at a given point in time, is called the limit order book.
A trade takes place when a buy offer and a sell offer cross. In general, traders can also submit
buy or sell orders at any price («market orders »)
56. These orders are executed immediately at the
best available prices in the market. The auction can take place at one physical location (e.g. a
trading floor) or/and through a computer network.
Order-driven markets can be organized either as call markets or continuous order-driven
markets. In a call market, orders accumulate over time. At specific points in time (e.g. at the
beginning and at the end of the trading day), the orders are executed at a single price. This price
is in general
57 chosen such that it maximizes the trading volume
58. Buy orders with a lower price
and sell orders with a higher price are executed. On the contrary, in continuous markets, a trade
takes place every time two orders can be executed against each other.
Quote-Driven Markets
In a quote-driven market, public investors (or their brokers) cannot trade directly among
themselves. In order to carry out a transaction, they must contact a dealer who uses his own
inventory in order to execute the trade. Dealers post ask and bid prices and the number of shares
they are willing to trade at these prices. Depending on the organization of the market, these
quotes are firm or indicative. In general dealers must post quotes for a minimum size. Trades are
ultimately conducted by telephone
59.
                                                       
56 We describe in Section 5.3.2 the different types of orders in order-driven markets.
57 The clearing price is not always determined in the system, however. In crossing networks, the clearing price is
the price posted in another marketplace.
58 In absence of price discreteness, this price would be the price such that the number of buy orders is equal the
number of sell orders.
59 In some dealer markets (e.g. Nasdaq), small orders can be executed automatically against dealers’quotes.37
Table 1: European Equity Trading Systems








France Paris Bourse NSC Nouveau Système de Cotation 1994* ALL
















eXchange Electronic TRAding 1997 (XETRA) ALL
Netherlands Amsterdam Stock Exchange TSA Trading System Amsterdam 1994 ALL
Switzerland Swiss Exchange SWX SWiss eXchange 1995 ALL




















*NSC upgrades CAC, the previous electronic trading system of the Bourse, introduced in 1986.38
Table 2.1 Trading Mechanism and Stock Type*
Segmentation according to Market Capitalization
Companies Capitalization Name of Trading Segment Type of Trading Mechanism







• Official markets (Amtlicher Handel
and Geregelter Markt)
• Official markets (SMAX)
 
• Neuer Markt
? Order-Driven Market (XETRA) and Floor
Trading
? Order-Driven Market (XETRA) with
possibility of market-making («Betreuers)
and Floor Trading
? Order-Driven Market (XETRA) with
possibility of market-making («Betreuers»)
and Floor Trading
 London Stock Exchange* • Large
• Medium
• Small
• Main Market (Official Market)
• Main Market  (Official Market)
• AIM
 
 - Order-Driven (SETS) or quote-driven Market
(SEAQ) according to market liquidity
 - Order-Driven (SETS) or quote-driven (SEAQ)
according to market liquidity
? Order-Driven and Quote-driven with one
dealer per stock (SEATS-PLUS).






 -  Order-Driven Market (NSC)
 - Order-Driven Market (NSC) with possibility of
one dealer per stock («Animateur »)
 - Call Market (NSC) at the open and close with
market making in between call auctions.
 Swiss Exchange  All capitalization  No segmentation based on stock
capitalization
 - Continuous order-driven market (SWX)
 *Some markets have specific trading segments for foreign stocks (e.g. SEAQ-I in the London Stock Exchange). We do not mention these segments in Table 1.
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 Table 2.2: Trading Mechanism and Types of Stocks (Ctd.)
 
 Segmentation according to Liquidity
 
   Stock Liquidity  Trading Segment  Type of Trading Mechanism
 Amsterdam Stock Exchange • High Liquidity
• Medium and Low Liquidity
• AEX and AMX stocks
• Other stocks
? Continuous Order-Driven Market, automatic execution.
? Order Book managed by Hoekman






? Continuous Order-Driven Market (XETRA) and Floor Trading
? Continuous Order-Driven Market (XETRA) with possibility of
market-making («Betreuers) and Floor Trading
? One or several call auctions per day (XETRA) with possibility of
market-making («Betreuers») and Floor Trading






? Continuous Order-Driven Market (SETS)
? Quote-Driven Market (SEAQ)
? Continuous Order-Driven and Quote-driven with one dealer per
stock (SEATS-PLUS).






? Continuous Order-Driven Market (NSC)
? Continuous Order-Driven Market (NSC) with possibility of one
dealer per stock. («Animateur»).
? Two call auctions per day (NSC) with the possibility of one dealer
per stock «Animateur».
 
 Swiss Exchange • All levels of liquidity • No segmentation based
on stock liquidity
   Continuous order-driven market (SWX)
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 Table 3: Trading Mechanism and Order Sizes
 
   Categories of Order Sizes  Type of Trading Mechanism
 NSC • Large orders >  1 NBS* (for most liquid
stocks only)
• Medium-sized and small orders
? Principal trading or limit order book .
? 
? Limit order book or Principal trading within limit order book
 SETS • Very large orders> 20 NMS**.
• Large orders (> 8NMS) and Medium-Sized
orders
• Small orders
? Principal trading. These trades are not eligible on SETS.
? Principal trading or limit order book. WPA for orders >
8xNMS***
? Retail Service Providers (principal trading) or limit order
book.
 
 SWX • Large orders > CHF 200,000
• Medium-Sized orders
• Small orders
? Principal trading or limit order book
? Limit order book
         Odd lots executed in a separate limit order book





? Principal trading or limit order book with one specialist per
stock («Hoekman»).
? Limit order book with one specialist per stock («Hoekman»).
? Executed against specialist’s position at best bid and ask
prices.




? Limit Order Book or «Vermittlungs –und Suchmarkt»***
? Limit Order Book and/or principal trading.
? Call markets and/or principal trading.
 *NBS: «Normal Bloc Size». The NBS is the minimum order size for an order to be eligible as a block trade. See footnote 19.
 ** NMS: «Normal Market Size». One NMS represents at least 2% of a security’s average trading volume.
 *** Worked Principal Agreements (WPA) are described in Section 5.2.
 **** «Vermittlungs –und Suchmarkt»: block trading facility which will be implemented with XETRA Release 4.41
 Table 4: Trading Mechanism and Time of the Trading Day
 
 





 Use of Call Market in:                Market Opening                 Market Closing  Intraday (combined with
continuous trading)
 Trading Systems      
 NSC  Yes  Yes  No
 SETS  Yes  No  No
 SWX  Yes  Yes  No
 TSA  Yes (price is determined by Hoekman)  No  No
 XETRA  Yes  Yes  Yes
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 Table 5: Degree of consolidation of the order flow
 
   NSC            SETS  SWX  TSA         XETRA
 Order flow • All orders can trade in
central limit order
book.
• Block Trades can be
conducted away from
the central limit order





• Two trading venues
for all order sizes:
1? Central Limit Order
Book
2? Principal trading with
dealers outside SETS.







• All round lots can be
traded in central limit
order book
 
• Odd lots are handled
in a separate limit
order book.





• All orders below a
given threshold must
be traded at best bid
and offer.
• odd lots executed
against the
Hoekman’s position.




• Two trading venues:
 





 Price link  Yes*
 














 * Except for OTC trades that have the following characteristics. They must be at least equal to FF50m in value or 2% of the company’s capital for stocks with a market
capitalization equal to or greater than FF1bn and 5% of the company’s capital otherwise.43
 Table 6: Role of Dealers
   Obligations  Privileges
 NSC    
 Principal traders  - No specific obligations: can trade all stocks on own account at best market
prices
 - No privileges
 Block traders
 (for most liquid stocks)
 - No specific obligations: can trade blocks on own account at prices at or
within Weighted Average Spread
 - Publication delay if trade as principal
 Animateurs  - Continuously post bid and ask quotes for a minimum quantity and a
maximum spread
 - Make similar offers before call auctions
 - No trading fees
 - Pool of liquidity (cash and shares) may be provided by major
shareholders (liquidity agreement)
 SETS    
 Retail Service Providers  - No specific obligations: can execute retail orders on own account at best
market prices
 
 - No privileges
 Principal traders  - No specific obligations: can execute large trades on own account
 - For WPA: price and size improvements must be provided
 - Publication delay
 
 SWX  - No specific obligations  - No privileges
 TSA    
 Hoekman  - Continuously post bid and ask quotes
 - Trade only when insufficient order flow
 - Trade only with members (restricted capacity)
 - Execute odd lots on its own account
 - Fee (high courtage fee) when acts as principal
 - Can freeze the order book when quote is lifted or hit
 - Only one Hoekman per stock
 Principal traders
 (Retail orders)
 - Can trade for own account at prices at or within best bid and ask prices with
order book interaction.
 - No privileges
 Principal traders
(Wholesale orders)
 - No specific obligation: can trade on own account at any price.  - No privileges
 XETRA    
 Betreuers  - Post two-sided quotes when requested by members
 - Post two-sided quotes in call auctions
 - No trading fees
 - Knowledge of the identity of the trader placing a request
 - Preferential access to surplus in call auctions44
 Table 7: Pre-Trade Transparency in Continuous Order-Driven Markets
 











   Members  Investors  Members  Investors  Members  Investors  Members  Investors  Members  Investors
 




































































 *The «Hoekman» always knows the identity of the traders submitting orders. The traders who post limit orders can decide to reveal their identity to the market.
 ** «Betreuers» have access to brokers ID who make a quote request.
 *** Hidden orders in TSA will be introduced in 1999. They will be called «Drip-In-Orders» .
 ****Hidden orders are marked as such in the order book.45
 Table 8 (ctd.): Pre-Trade Transparency in pre-trading phase of Call Auctions
 






























 * Only orders that would not be executed at the Indicative Equilibrium Price (IEP) are disclosed. In addition to the IEP, the total trading volume that would be eligible for
trades at IEP is revealed.
 ** The entire book is revealed to members only 5 minutes before call.
 *** The LSE does not disseminate the indicative equilibrium price but data vendors can.
 **** 5 minutes before call for members only.




 Table 9: Price and Publication of Large Orders
   Publication Delay for Block Trades  Block Price
 NSC  Order Size < 5 NBS:
? 2 hours if broker acts as counterparty
? Immediate if broker acts as agent
 
 Order Size > 5 NBS
? Next morning if broker acts as counterparty
? Immediate if broker acts as agent
Structural blocks*
-      Immediate or T+2 if member acting as
principal has not offset his position
i (i)     No obligation to execute offers posted at better prices  in
              the limit order book.
?ii? Block price must be inside the weighted average
spread, that is computed using the best ask and bid
prices in the limit order book up to NBS**.
(iii) Structural block prices can be within +/-10% of the best
bid and ask quote
SETS*** Ordinary risk trade: Immediate publication.
Worked Principal Agreement: End of the trading
day or once 80% of  the transaction is offset
(i) No obligation to execute offers posted at a better
price in the limit order book.
(ii) No price link with central limit order book
SWX 30 minutes. (i) No obligation to execute offers posted at better prices in the
limit order book.
(ii) Rule of Best Execution: Same execution prices as those that
could be realized in limit order book.
TSA Publication of wholesale trades at the end of
trading day.
Wholesale orders can be executed at any price
XETRA N/A N/A
*The value of a structural block must represent at least 2% of the company’s capital or be greater than FF50m for a stock with a market capitalization larger than FF1bn.
It must be at least 5% of the company’s capital otherwise.
** A larger spread (SuperWAS) is computed for block trades larger than 5NBS on request to SBF. These trades can be executed at prices within +/-5% of best bid and ask
prices.
*** Different publication rules are used for stocks that trade in SEAQ (See Pagano and Steil (1995)).47
Table 10.1: Order Types during Continuous Trading Periods
Definitions:
Limit Order: an order that specifies a price and the maximum quantity a trader is willing to buy or to sell at this price.
Market Order: an order to buy or to sell a given quantity at any price.
At Market Order: an order to buy or to sell a given quantity at the best posted quotes. The unfilled part of the order is automatically transformed
into a limit order.
Stop Market Order: an order that is transformed into a market order when the market price reaches the price of the stop order.
Stop Limit Order: an order that is transformed into a limit order when the market price reaches the price of the stop order.
Fill or Kill Order: an order for a given quantity that is executed entirely or not at all.
Execute or Eliminate Order: a fill or kill order that can be partially executed. The unfilled part is canceled.
NSC SETS SWX TSA XETRA
Limit Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
At Market Orders Yes No No No No
Stop Market Order Yes No Yes No Yes
Stop Limit Order Yes No Yes No Yes
Fill or Kill Orders Yes* No No No Yes
Execute or Eliminate orders Yes Yes Yes*** No Yes
*In NSC, Fill or Kill orders are called All or None Orders.
** In NSC, Execute or Eliminate Orders are called Fill and Kill Orders.
*** In SWX, Execute or Eliminate Orders are called Accept Orders.48
Table 10.2: Order Types in Call auctions
NSC SETS SWX TSA XETRA
Limit Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Order Yes                   No Yes Yes Yes
At Market Orders Yes No No No No
Stop Market Order Yes No No No Yes
Stop Limit Order Yes No No No Yes
Fill or Kill Orders                    No No No No No
Execute or Eliminate orders No No No No No
Table 11: Tick Sizes
NSC (in Euro) SETS (in £) SWX (in CHF) TSA (in Euro) XETRA (in DM)
P < 50 : 0.01
50 £P<100euro: 0.05euro
100 £P < 500: 0.10euro
500 £P : 0.50
P < 500 : 0.25
500 £ P<1000: 0.5
1000 £ P: 1
P < 10: 0.01
10 £ P < 100: 0.05
100 £ P < 250F:0.25
250 £P < 500F:  0.5
500 £ P < 5000F: 1
5000 £ P: 5
P< 1 : 0,01
P>1 : 0,10
P < 100 : 0.01
100 £ P : 0.0549
Table 12: Clearing and Settlement











Settlement Date T+3 T+2 T+5 T+3** Immediately after each transaction
; SFI-DVP (Simultaneously final
irrevocable delivery versus
payment)
Netting Yes No* No Yes No
Central Securities
Depository






* Trade by trade settlement for securities but net settlement for cash payments.











































































































































Figure 1: Market Capitalization of European













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Market Turnover - 1997
(in USD million) 
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